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ABSTRACT
When it comes to a question as notoriously unclear as “What is the meaning of life?”, 
clarifying the question and its conceptual setting is a necessary step before attempting to 
answer the question. The analysis of the concept of “the meaning of life” is a twofold task; 
“the meaning” and “life” both need to be examined. In this paper, I primarily focus on “the 
meaning.” I argue that, although there is much disagreement and confusion in the literature 
about the meaning of “the meaning” as it is applied to life, there is one most plausible 
interpretation of this notion. In the end, even though I do not answer the question of the 
meaning of life, I propose an account of what a correct answer to the question is supposed 
to look like, based on my original function analysis of “the meaning”.
Keywords: the meaning of life, meaningfulness, meaning in life.
RESUMO
No tocante a uma questão notoriamente pouco clara como “Qual é o sentido da vida?”, 
esclarecer a questão e seu marco conceitual é um passo necessário antes de tentar respon-
dê-la. A análise do conceito “o sentido da vida” implica uma tarefa dupla: tanto “o sentido” 
quanto “vida” precisam ser examinados. Neste artigo, enfoco primordialmente o termo “o 
sentido”. Sustento que, embora haja muita divergência e confusão na literatura sobre o 
significado de “o sentido” quando este termo é aplicado à vida, há uma interpretação mais 
plausível dessa noção. No fim, embora não respondendo a questão do sentido da vida, 
apresento uma proposta de como poderia ser uma resposta correta a essa questão, com 
base em minha análise da função original de “o sentido”.
Palavras-chave: o sentido da vida, significatividade, sentido na vida.
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To many who are not professional philosophers, “What 
is the meaning of life?” is the paradigm philosophical ques-
tion; however, partly because of its apparent unclarity, this 
question does not receive as much attention from academia 
as is supposed in popular culture. Clarifying this question and 
its conceptual setting is a necessary step before attempting to 
answer it. The analysis of the concept of “the meaning of life” 
is a twofold task; “the meaning” and “life” both need to be ex-
amined. In this paper, I primarily focus on “the meaning.” I 
argue that, although there is much disagreement and confu-
sion in the literature about the meaning of “the meaning” as 
it is applied to life, there is one most plausible interpretation 
of this notion.
In the first section, I briefly explore some of the inter-
pretations of the question “What is the meaning of life?” 
(hereafter QML) and the answers given in the philosophical 
literature. In the second section, I discuss interpretive strate-
gies for handling the apparent ambiguity of QML. In the third 
and the fourth sections, I examine two concepts, namely the 
psychological meaning in life and the meaningfulness of life, 
and point out the ways in which they are distinct from the 
meaning of life (hereafter ML) and the ways in which they are 
confused with ML in the literature. In the fifth section, I pro-
pose and defend my original function analysis of “the meaning.” 
In the end, even though I do not answer the question of the 
meaning of life, I propose an account of what a correct answer 
to the question is supposed to look like, for any given sense of 
the term “life.”
I. The meaning of life: questions 
and answers
Among the philosophers who offer answers to QML, 
there is no consensus on what the question is really about. 
Here are some questions that are offered in the literature as 
interpretations of QML. 
“What, if anything, makes a life meaningful?” (Metz, 
2002, p. 781); “What is it all about?” “What is (are) the pur-
pose(s) of life (my life)?” “What makes life valuable?” “What 
makes life worthwhile and not irredeemably futile?” “What 
makes life significant?” “Does a particular life achieve a good 
purpose?” “What makes life worth living?” (Seachris, 2011); 
“What is the purpose of human existence?” “What should we 
seek?” “What ends (if any) are really worthwhile?” (Nielsen, 
2000, p. 239, 246); “What is the use of a man’s life?” “Under 
what conditions is a man’s life of some use?” (G. E. Moore, 
quoted in Moorhead, 1988, p. 128), “Is human life ever 
worthwhile?” “Does (or can) human life have any meaning?” 
(Edwards, 2000, p. 133); “What is it all for?” “Why am I here?” 
“What is the point of it all?” (Britton, 1969, p. 3); “Does life 
have a purpose or point?” “Does life have some value?” “Does 
my life signify something?” (Thomson, 2003, p. 12); “Why 
live?” “Why is life worth living?” (Thagard, 2010, p. 1, 3); and 
many other variations.
From the above interpretations, we can identify some 
concepts that are regarded to be closely related, even identical, 
to the meaning of life, such as the purpose of life, what makes 
life valuable/worthwhile, and the reason/explanation of life. 
We also see that some interpretations of QML are about the 
existence of human life in general, some are about the life of 
the person who asks the question, and some are about exis-
tence in its entirety. Most importantly, some questions in the 
list are descriptive/explanatory and some are normative2. 
Let us now briefly survey the answers given to QML 
in the literature, which will help us better understand about 
what different philosophers take the question to be. Accord-
ing to Metz (2001, 2002, 2007, 2013a, 2013b) and Seachris 
(2011), supernaturalism, subjective naturalism, and objective 
naturalism are the standard categories of answers given to the 
normative versions of QML. 
Supernaturalistic theories are those that derive the 
meaning of life from God, from the soul, or from both. For 
example, according to the “purpose theory,” what gives a life 
meaning is act ing according to God’s purpose for that life 
(Metz, 2002, p. 784-7; 2013b, p. 79-117; also see Metz, 2000). 
Another supernaturalistic theory is Robert Nozick’s “infinity 
theory.” Nozick argues that life can only be meaningful if it 
is linked to an infinite being, because only an infinite being 
can be meaningful in itself (Metz, 2002, p. 788-789; Nozick, 
1989, p. 167). Similarly, Charles Hartshorne argues that a life 
can only be meaningful if there is a God who appreciates and 
immortalizes (by remembering/knowing) that life (Metz, 
2002, p. 788). Some supernaturalistic theories emphasize the 
importance of having an immortal soul. For example, accord-
ing to “ultimate consequence theory,” life can be meaningful 
only if it makes a permanent difference and that is possible 
only if life will not end (Metz, 2002, p. 789). 
Subjective naturalistic theories assert that the meaning 
of a person’s life consists in her subjective attitudes towards 
life, such as setting one’s own purposes and following them, 
loving something/someone, or engaging in creative act ivities 
(Metz, 2002, p. 793, 797). It is important to note that these 
so-called subjective naturalist theories are only subjective in 
the sense that they explain meaning in terms of subjective at-
titudes, but, of course, if a subjective naturalist theory is true, 
then it is objectively true. For example, if the meaning of life is 
2 I use the term “normative” in the wider sense. A statement/theory is normative if it states what one should or ought to do, or what is 
right and what is wrong, but I will also regard any evaluative statement/theory as normative. So, a normative statement/theory is any 
statement/theory that declares something is better. Furthermore, a concept F is normative if and only if the statement “x is F” implies 
either that x is better than something else or something is better than x. For example, “good,” “right,” “wrong,” “worthwhile” are 
normative concepts, and so is “meaningful.” A meaningful life is better than a meaningless life ceteris paribus. I will talk more about the 
normativity of the term “meaningful” in section 4.
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engaging in creative act ivities, the preferred creative act ivities 
would change from person to person, since the desirability of 
an act ivity is a subjective matter, but, if this theory is true, 
then that one’s life is meaningful only if one engages in cre-
ative act ivities is an objective fact.
Objective naturalistic theories state that a non-super-
natural objective/mind-independent component is necessary 
for meaningfulness. For example, Susan Wolf (2010, 2015) 
argues that, unless an act ivity is objectively valuable, it can-
not make life more meaningful. According to Wolf, “mean-
ing arises when subjective attract ion meets objective attrac-
tiveness” (2010, p. 9). Another objective naturalistic view is 
that (objectively) morally good act ions make life meaningful 
(Metz, 2002, p. 797-798). 
These theories are not only normative theories about 
what makes life meaningful (as opposed to meaningless), 
they are also theoretical rather than factual. These are theories 
about what would make life meaningful under what condi-
tions. Metz writes, about one of the standard answers to the 
normative question: “[this] theory is a thesis about the con-
ditions for a meaningful life, not about whether these con-
ditions obtain” (Metz, 2002, p. 784). So, a supernaturalistic 
theory according to which the meaning of life is worshiping 
God does not also claim that God exists; what this normative 
theory of meaning asserts is merely that one’s life is meaning-
ful if and only if God exists and one worships God. 
Descriptive/explanatory answers are also given to QML. 
According to Milton Munitz (1986), QML is a question 
about the place of human existence in the universe (p. 258). 
When Stephen Hawking declared the death of philosophy 
and argued that science now takes over the traditional philo-
sophical endeavor of answering the most profound questions, 
he was talking about the descriptive interpretations of QML:
But almost all of us must sometimes won-
der: Why are we here? Where do we come 
from? Traditionally, these are questions 
for philosophy, but philosophy is dead. … 
Scientists have become the bearers of the 
torch of discovery in our quest for knowl-
edge (Hawking, qtd. in Warman, 2011).
In fact, any formulation of the QML as a why question about 
existence, such as “Why do we (or I, or anything) exist?” is a 
descriptive/explanatory interpretation of QML.
Seachris (2009), similarly, argues that the primary 
meaning of “the meaning of life” is explanatory. The mean-
ing of life, according to Seachris, is essentially a true narrative 
about life. He quotes philosophers who have similar views; 
Garrett Thomson writes that “to know the meaning of life 
is to know a true metaphysical narrative about human life in 
general that somehow makes sense of our lives,” and accord-
ing to John Cottingham, when we ask about the meaning of 
life “we are asking about our relationship with the rest of the 
universe” (qtd. in Seachris, 2009, p. 5). 
Seachris argues that when we ask “What is the meaning 
of life?”, what we mean by “meaning” is what a father means 
by “meaning” when he goes into his children’s playroom after 
he hears screaming and yelling, finds the children fighting and 
asks in an authoritative manner “what is the meaning of this?” 
(2009, p. 15-16). What the father is in search of is an expla-
nation, a narrative, a story about the fighting. According to 
Seachris, “the accurate story is the meaning the father seeks” 
(2009, p. 16, emphasis in the original). 
II. Two interpretive strategies: 
pluralist and monist
It seems that one can plausibly construe QML as a nor-
mative or as a descriptive question. Furthermore, QML can 
be a question about life (or even existence) in general or a 
question about a generic person’s or a particular person’s life. 
It can be posed as a theoretical question or a factual question. 
QML is apparently ambiguous in more than one dimension. 
There are two main interpretive strategies to handle this 
apparent ambiguity of QML, which I will call, adopting the 
terms from Metz (2013b, ch. 2), “The Pluralist Strategy” and 
“The Monist Strategy.” 
The pluralist strategy is to deny that QML can be un-
derstood as a single question. According to this approach, 
the best way to interpret QML is to take it to be essentially 
ambiguous among a cluster of different but interrelated ques-
tions and try to determine exactly which questions those are.
Metz (2002) argues that QML can best be understood 
as a disjunction of the following interrelated questions: 
What should an agent strive for besides ob-
taining happiness and fulfilling obligations? 
Which aspects of a human life are worthy 
of great esteem or admiration? In what re-
spect should a rational being connect with 
value beyond his animal self? … Which 
goods command our awe? How may an in-
dividual identify with something incompara-
bly higher? What is worthy of our love and 
allegiance? (2002, p. 802-803).3
According to Metz, what makes these questions inter-
related is that the standard answers given to QML in the 
literature are in fact answers to these questions and those 
answers exhibit family resemblances (2001, p. 150; 2002, p. 
802; 2007, p. 211). 
Baggini (2005) defends a similar view. He maintains that 
“What is the meaning of life?” is an unclear sentence and it is a 
3 Metz gives slightly different lists of questions in his The Concept of a Meaningful Life (2001), p. 150-151, and New Developments in 
the Meaning of Life (2007), p. 211.
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place-holder for a set of questions such as “Why are we here? 
What is the purpose of life? Is it enough just to be happy? Is my 
life serving some greater purpose? Are we here to help others or 
just ourselves?” (Baggini, 2005, p. 1)4. According to Mawson’s 
hypothesis of polyvalence, when one asks what the meaning of life 
is, “one asks an assemblage of largely overlapping, but signifi-
cantly different, questions at once” (2010, p. 20).
Seachris (2009), however, rejects this pluralistic strate-
gy and offers his Narrative Interpretation instead, according to 
which QML demands a meta-narrative of life. He interprets 
QML as a single question and, without rephrasing QML, expli-
cates the term “meaning.” Seachris’s Narrative Interpretation is 
one of the possible interpretations of QML in accordance with 
the Monist Strategy. Seachris (2009) argues that his interpreta-
tion of QML is more plausible than the pluralist interpretations 
because his Narrative Interpretation retains the original ques-
tion and retaining the original question is more desirable than 
reformulating it, and when we rephrase QML as a collection 
of various questions about purpose, value, worth, etc., QML 
becomes a question about those concepts, which are logically 
distinct from the concept of the meaning of life. Furthermore, 
he points out that his interpretation gives a unified account and 
hence his interpretation, as opposed to the pluralist interpre-
tive strategy, does not ignore the definite article in the question 
“What is the meaning of life?” (p. 27-29). I submit that, for the 
reasons that Seachris elaborates, a monist analysis is preferable 
and a pluralist strategy must be adopted only if no acceptable 
monist analysis is available. 
If there is no plausible monist analysis of QML, then 
this can be due to the inherent ambiguity of “the meaning” 
or “life” or both. Instead of analyzing the ambiguity of QML 
as a whole, it would be easier to inquire the notions of “the 
meaning” and “life” separately. My aim in this paper is to ana-
lyze the concept of “the meaning” in QML, so I will not offer 
a thorough examination of the concept of “life,” but I will just 
mention some of the interpretations of “life” in the meaning 
of life literature. After that, I will examine “the meaning” and 
argue that a monist analysis of this notion is possible.
According to Metz (2013b, p. 37-58), the bearers of 
meaning are particular human lives (and parts of those lives). 
However, questions such as “What is it all about?” (Seachris, 
2011), “Why does the universe exist? Why does something 
exist rather than nothing?” (Britton, 1969, p. 3) are also stat-
ed as interpretations of QML in the literature. Some philos-
ophers interpreted QML as a question about existence of the 
human sp ecies, such as Nielsen when he asked “What is the 
purpose of human existence?” (1981, p. 186). “Why are we 
here?” is also a question about humanity in general (Mawson, 
2010, p. 21). Normative questions about the meaning of life, 
such as “Is human life ever worthwhile?” “Does (or can) hu-
man life have any meaning?” (Edwards, 1981), typically are 
theoretical questions about a generic human life, rather than 
factual questions about the actual meaningfulness of partic-
ular lives. Although Metz argues that the bearer of meaning 
is particular lives, his question “What, if anything, makes a 
life meaningful?” (Metz, 2002, p. 781) is also about the life of 
a hypothetical generic human individual. QML can also be 
asked about existent particular lives, and most importantly 
one’s own life. One of the most popular formulations of QML 
is about the life of the person who asks the question (Thom-
son, 2003, p. 12; Britton, 1969, p. 3; Mawson, 2010, p. 21). 
This is also how Tolstoy (1987, p. 19-80) and Camus (1991, 
p. 4) understood the question of the meaning of life, as they 
regarded the question to be basically about suicide. 
Probably a pluralist strategy would be the right choice to 
examine the concept of “life” in QML, but the questions that 
Metz and other pluralists enumerate do not differ from one 
another significantly with resp ect to their employment of dif-
ferent senses of “life;” rather, they focus on different senses of 
“the meaning.” What I argue is, contrary to the pluralists, that 
if we choose one of the senses of “life” and ask QML sp ecifical-
ly about that, then QML will not be an ambiguous question. 
Before I offer my analysis of the concept of the meaning, 
I want to examine two concepts that are sometimes confused 
with the meaning of life (ML), namely psychological meaning 
in life and meaningfulness of life.
III. The psychological 
meaning in life
The central subject matter of contemporary positive 
psychology is meaning in life. Positive psychology is “the sci-
entific study of what makes life most worth living” (Peter-
son, 2008) from the persp ectives of how pleasant, good (eu-
daimonic) and meaningful one’s life is (Seligman and Pawelski, 
2003). Various studies report that having meaning in life has 
positive effects on psychological well-being and lack of it im-
pacts psychological well-being negatively (Cohen and Cairns, 
2010, p. 2; Klefteras and Psarra, 2012, p. 337). 
The psychological notion of meaning in life is substan-
tially different from the philosophical notion of the meaning 
of life. Psychological meaning in life (hereafter P-MiL) is the 
perceived meaningfulness of one’s life from one’s point of view. 
It is “the cognizance of order, coherence, and purpose in one’s 
existence, the pursuit and attainment of worthwhile goals, 
and an accompanying sense of fulfillment” (Reker and Wong, 
1988, p. 221, emphasis added). The Meaning in Life Ques-
tionnaire, one of the most commonly used tools to measure 
P-MiL, is constructed to measure “sense made of, and signif-
icance felt regarding, the nature of one’s being and existence” 
(Steger et al., 2006, p. 81). Another questionnaire that is fre-
quently used to measure meaning in life, namely the Purpose 
of Life Questionnaire, is designed to measure “the ontological 
4 Note that Baggini’s list contains both normative and descriptive questions. Metz, on the other hand, includes only the normative ques-
tions and dismisses descriptive/explanatory questions about life.
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significance of life from the point of view of the experiencing 
individual” (Crumbaugh and Maholick, 1964, p. 201). 
The most salient difference between the concepts of 
P-MiL and ML is that, conceptually, P-MiL is subjective but 
ML is not. Theories of P-MiL are about the conditions under 
which one perceives her life to be meaningful. Theories of ML 
(including so-called subjective naturalist theories), on the other 
hand, are about the objective conditions of meaning which are 
not contingent upon one’s perception of meaning. Consider a 
newborn child. She clearly does not have P-MiL, but according 
to some theories of ML, such as supernaturalist theories, her 
life can still have objective meaning (maybe God’s purpose for 
creating her constitutes the meaning of her life). To see the dif-
ference more clearly, let’s take a subjective naturalist theory of 
ML, say, Harry Frankfurt’s theory that ML is “devoting oneself 
to what one loves” (2002, p. 250). According to Frankfurt’s the-
ory, if one devotes herself to something she loves, even though 
she does not feel or think that her life is meaningful, her life still 
has meaning. P-MiL, however, cannot exist if one does not per-
ceive it. Similarly, it is conceptually possible that one’s life may 
be objectively meaningless even though one has P-MiL. Fur-
thermore, P-MiL is more like a general state of mind (or mood) 
and does not signify something unique. The meaning of life, on 
the other hand, at least prima facie, is supposed to be unique, as 
the definite article suggests.
In the literature on ML, there is some confusion be-
tween ML and P-MiL. For example, Rudolf Wohlgennant 
takes “meaningful life” to be synonymous with “[life in which 
a person] feels satisfied upon achieving her aims” (quoted in 
Metz 2002, p. 801). Wohlgennant offers his account not as a 
subjective naturalistic theory of ML, but as an analysis of the 
concept of ML, which indicates that what he has in mind is 
not ML but P-MiL.
Paul Edwards (2000) argues that there cannot be ML 
independent of one’s knowledge about and attitude towards 
it. He writes, 
If a superhuman being has a plan in which I 
am included, this fact will make (or help to 
make) my life meaningful in the terrestrial 
sense only if I know the plan and approve of 
it and of my place in it, so that working to-
ward the realization of the plan gives direc-
tion to my actions (Edwards, 2000, p. 145).
Again, what cannot possibly exist unless one knows and approves 
of it is P-MiL, not ML. Similarly, A. J. Ayer equivocates between 
ML and P-MiL when he writes: “I do not think there can be any 
general answer to the question, what is the meaning of life. Our 
individual lives have whatever meaning, or meanings, we succeed 
in giving them” (quoted in Moorhead, 1988, p. 20).
IV. Meaningfulness of life
Meaningfulness of life is another concept that can be con-
fused with ML; and it is easier to confuse because ML and 
meaningfulness of life are not as conceptually distinct from 
each other as ML and P-MiL are. Both the meaning and the 
meaningfulness of a given life exist objectively, if they exist 
at all. The correct theory of ML could turn out to be a sub-
jective naturalistic theory which asserts that, say, “setting and 
pursuing one’s own purposes in life” is the meaning of life, but 
if this is the correct answer to QML, then it is objectively the 
correct answer. And if the correct answer to QML is “setting 
and pursuing one’s own purposes in life,” then unless one sets 
and pursues her purposes in life, her life is objectively mean-
ingless, even though she might be satisfied with her life. 
However, meaning and meaningfulness are not equiva-
lent to each other. Unlike meaning, I take meaningfulness to be 
an obviously normative term. Imagine two lives. These two 
lives have exactly the same amount (and type, if you think 
that is important) of happiness, satisfact ion, knowledge, free-
dom, virtue, etc., but they differ in that one of these lives is 
meaningful, and the other one is meaningless. Which life is 
better? Which life is preferable, more intrinsically choicewor-
thy? If you don’t think that the difference in meaningfulness 
breaks the axiological balance between these otherwise indis-
tinguishable lives, then you are using the term “meaningful-
ness” in a different sense than I and many other philosophers 
who interpret meaningfulness of a life to be about worth-
whileness of a life use the term. When people ask “How can 
I make my life more meaningful?” I take it that they ask a 
question about a better life.
Unlike the meaningfulness of life, the meaning of life 
is not an obviously normative concept. A meaningful life is 
better than a meaningless life, but, as we have seen, many phi-
losophers regard ML as a descriptive concept, or at least they 
recognize that a descriptive sense of meaning is as plausible as 
a normative sense. Any interpretation of QML that regards 
it as a question about some kind of explanation of life (or ex-
istence) rather than an evaluative question about the condi-
tions of meaningfulness employs a descriptive notion of ML. 
There are other ways in which meaning and meaning-
fulness differ from each other. Suppose that a supernatural-
istic theory is the correct answer to QML. In that case, say, 
worshipping God is the meaning of all lives but only the lives 
of the people who actually worship God are meaningful (pro-
vided that God exists). So, the fact that there is an overarch-
ing meaning of life, which is the meaning of every life, does 
not guarantee that every life is meaningful. Meaning is not 
the same as meaningfulness and confusing meaningfulness of 
life and the meaning of life causes serious problems for the 
analysis of the concept of the meaning.
Furthermore, QML asks what the meaning of life is. The 
definite article before “meaning” indicates that there is only 
one meaning of life (given a particular sense of “life”). More 
than one thing can make life meaningful together, but there 
can be only one the meaning of life. Lastly, a meaningful life 
can be more meaningful than another meaningful life, but, in-
tuitively, the meaning of life does not come in degrees; either 
there is a meaning or there is not.
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Let’s see an example of the confusion between the mean-
ing of life and the meaningfulness of life. According to Metz, 
it is obvious that meaning comes in degrees: “Nearly all those 
writing on meaning in life believe that it comes in degrees, 
so that, say, some lives as a whole are more meaningful than 
others” (2013b, p. 4). Metz takes the question “What is the 
meaning of life?” to be synonymous with “What (if anything) 
makes life meaningful?” (2002, p. 781; 2007, p. 196) and “How 
(if at all) [can] one’s life … be meaningful?” (2013b, p. 17). 
From his persp ective, a life has meaning if and only if that life 
is meaningful, because he takes both “the meaning of life” and 
“meaningfulness of life” to denote importance/significance of 
life5. According to him, meaning has “inherent desirability and 
choiceworthiness” (2001, p. 140). This approach conceptu-
ally excludes all descriptive accounts of meaning. According 
to his view, all those philosophers who interpret QML to be 
about why we exist drastically misunderstand the question. 
Furthermore, intuitively, there are conceptually possible cases 
in which a life is not meaningful even though there is a mean-
ing of life. For example, as I mentioned above, according to 
some god-centered supernaturalistic theories, each life has 
a meaning, namely God’s purpose in creating that life, but 
the life of an atheist can be regarded as meaningless and not 
worth living, since the atheist rejects to serve the purpose that 
is assigned to her life by God. We cannot explain this concep-
tual possibility unless we distinguish between meaning and 
meaningfulness.
The meaning of life and the meaningfulness of life are 
separate but related notions. A successful analysis of the con-
cept of ML, I believe, must account for the distinction and 
connection between the meaning and the meaningfulness. 
According to my view, as I explain in the next section, exis-
tence of the meaning of life is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for the meaningfulness of life.
V. The meaning as the 
original function
Suppose that you are sp eaking to your friend, telling her 
about your latest philosophical discovery. Then you realize 
that she wears earphones and could not hear you. She was not 
aware that you were sp eaking to her the whole time. When 
you realize this, you stop sp eaking, because sp eaking to her 
while she is not even aware that you are sp eaking is meaning-
less. When you were sp eaking to her without realizing that 
she was not listening, your sp eaking was meaningless. Similar-
ly, trying to read a book in a foreign language that you don’t 
know is meaningless. Or, suppose you want to buy a Malibu 
beach house but you work for the minimum wage. Saving 
money for the Malibu beach house is meaningless for you, be-
cause even if you save all of your earnings, you cannot afford 
a Malibu beach house. For similar reasons, drinking water to 
get drunk is meaningless. 
What is common in all these examples is that there is a 
purpose that cannot be achieved. The purpose of sp eaking to 
someone is to be understood, the purpose of reading a book is 
to understand it. And, in the last two examples, your purpose 
for saving money is to buy a house at the Malibu Beach and 
your purpose for drinking water is to get drunk. If the act iv-
ity you are engaging in is incapable of producing the relevant 
result, then we think that that act ivity is meaningless, in the 
sense that it is pointless and futile.
So, at first glance, it might seem that the purpose of an 
act ivity is its meaning and that act ivity is meaningful as long 
as it serves its purpose. But this is not exactly true. Buying the 
Malibu beach house and getting drunk are set as purposes of 
saving money and drinking water by the person who engag-
es in these act ivities. But the meaning of life is supposed to 
be objective, one cannot just attribute an arbitrary meaning 
to her life as ML6. The examples of sp eaking and reading are 
more apt. To be understood is not just a purpose one subjec-
tively attributes to sp eaking. Similarly, understanding a text is 
the essential and objective purpose of reading. Understanding 
a text is what reading is for.
In my view, the meaning of sp eaking is to be understood 
by others and the meaning of reading is to understand a text; 
however, some points need to be clarified about the notion of 
meaning and its relation to meaningfulness. First of all, the 
meaning is more like a function, rather than a purpose that 
is deliberately set by someone. The function of a thing, as I 
understand the term, does not need to be intentionally set 
by some agent. For example, getting nutrients is the biological 
function of eating and reproduction is the biological function 
of sexual intercourse. They are functions, rather than purpos-
es, since eating and mating did not evolve teleologically for 
some future purpose or goal, but instead their function was 
realized as they evolved (cf. Searle, 1995). 
I will call the function that explains existence of a thing 
the “original function.” Not everything exists to serve a func-
tion. An original function features in a functional explanation 
of the existence of a thing; it is what that thing is for. Functional 
explanations are predominantly used in evolutionary biology, 
but also if a thing is intentionally created for some purpose, 
then serving that purpose counts as its original function. To be 
clear, the original function explains why something exists, but 
fulfilling the original function might not be a persistence con-
dition for that thing. Detecting light is the original function of 
eyes in general, which also explains the existence of each indi-
vidual eye, but blind eyes still exist even if they can’t serve their 
original function. They are supposed to see, but they don’t cease 
to exist just because they cannot see.
5 Metz maintains that the phrase “meaningful life” is synonymous with the phrases “significant existence,” “life that matters” (Metz, 
2002, p. 801); “important [life],” “[existence that] has a point” (Metz, 2001, p. 138); “way of being that matters” (Metz, 2013b, p. 21).
6 This point is systematically ignored by those who mistakenly equate ML with P-MiL, as I discussed in section 3.
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I believe that “original function” is an appropriate syn-
onym for “meaning” in QML. It is related to the notion of 
purpose, although not identical to it, which explains why the 
concept of the meaning of life is often confused with the con-
cept of the purpose of life. The original function of a life is 
objective, in the sense that one cannot subjectively attribute 
an original function to an existent life. The original function 
of a life can be unique and not a cluster of different things, as 
the concept of “the meaning of life” suggests. The equivalence 
of the meaning of life and the original function also explains 
why QML is interpreted as a question about why we exist by 
many philosophers.
Now, given this analysis of the meaning, let us look at the 
relation between the meaning and the meaningfulness of life 
more closely. If something does not satisfy its original function, 
then it is objectively meaningless in the relevant sense. For ex-
ample, eating non-nutritious things, however delicious they 
may be, is meaningless, provided that, as an objective evolution-
ary fact, receiving nutrition is what eating is for. It is important 
to see, however, that its meaninglessness does not mean that 
one should not eat anything non-nutritious or that there is any-
thing morally wrong with this act ivity. Receiving pleasure can 
be a subjective purpose of engaging in objectively meaningless 
act ivities and this would be enough reason to engage in them. 
Similarly to the fact that one can have an objectively meaning-
less life but have P-MiL, an act ivity that does not serve its origi-
nal function can be desirable and satisfactory for other reasons. 
Another important point about the original function 
is that it can be negative. For example, if we are created by 
Descartes’ evil demon who deceives us about everything, in-
cluding the existence of the external world, then the original 
function, and hence the meaning, of life is a global deception. 
Or, suppose there are some people who are created by God to 
deterministically live a life that inevitably leads to Hell. Go-
ing to Hell is the original function and the meaning of their 
lives. Arguably, being created for being globally deceived or 
for Hell makes one’s life less meaningful and worthwhile than 
a life of a person who was not created for constant deception 
or Hell. So, not every life that fulfills its original function is 
meaningful. Although “the meaning of life” is a neutral con-
cept, the actual meaning of life can be negative or positive, 
that is, it can be objectively bad or objectively good/valuable. 
And, of course, a negative meaning does not make life more 
meaningful, since, conceptually, a meaningful life is ceteris pa-
ribus better than a meaningless life. A life created for constant 
deception or Hell is not ceteris paribus better than a life that 
is not created for constant deception or Hell. For something 
to be meaningful, aside from having and serving an original 
function, it must have a positive original function. A positive 
original function of life is such that, when it is fulfilled, it 
makes one’s life more worth living independent of the subjec-
tive satisfact ion one might or might not have from her life. In 
this sense, being deceived by the evil demon and waiting to go 
to Hell does not add to the meaningfulness of one’s life, but, 
for example, arguably, serving a benevolent god does. 
In my view, the meaning of life is the original function 
of life, and life is meaningful if and only if it has an objectively 
positive/valuable original function and fulfills that function. 
So, a life can be meaningless in the following ways:
1. The life does not have an original function.
2. The life has an original function, but its original func-
tion is not objectively valuable.
3. The life has an objectively valuable original function, 
but it doesn’t serve this function.
To be clear, I don’t claim that there actually is an objec-
tively valuable original function for our lives. Maybe there is 
no original function, maybe there is an original function but 
it is objectively negative, or maybe objective values don’t exist 
at all. My claim is conceptual. My claim is that, conceptually, 
our lives can be meaningful only if there is such an objectively 
valuable original function of life, and a fortiori, only if there is 
objective value at all (cf. Wolf, 2010, 2015).
This is a monist analysis of the concept of the meaning, 
but it is different from Seachris’s monism. As we have seen 
above, according to Seachris, the meaning of life is the true 
existential narrative of life, which is the concept of meaning a 
father employs when he asks to his fighting children “What’s 
the meaning of this fight?” Seachris argues that what the fa-
ther wants is a true narrative about the fight, but according to 
my view, provided that the “meaning” in the father’s question 
is same as the “meaning” in QML, what the father wants to 
know is the original function of the fight. In other words, his 
question can be rephrased as “What is this fight for?” Suppose 
that the fight is due to a misunderstanding, then there is no 
original function of the fight. There is a reason and explana-
tion of it, which can have the form of a narrative, but it is not 
an original function. In this case, the narrative about the mis-
understanding would be the meaning of the fight according to 
Seachris’s Narrative Interpretation, but the fight would have 
no meaning according to my analysis. 
Not any explanation/narrative of existence of some-
thing counts as the meaning of that thing. Every person’s ex-
istence is caused by her mother and father having sex, but we 
do not see it even as a candidate for the meaning of one’s life. 
It is an explanation, but not a functional explanation. Sup-
pose, on the other hand, a clone is created by geneticists to 
be scientifically examined and studied. Then, that clone has 
an original function, which is also the meaning of her life: to 
contribute to science by being scientifically examined. And if 
that is a positive/valuable function (which is very question-
able, esp ecially from a Kantian persp ective), then being stud-
ied by scientists makes her life meaningful (whether she has 
P-MiL or not is another question). 
Let us return to Seachris’s fighting children example. 
Now suppose that one of the children got jealous since she 
thought that her sister was prettier than she was, wanted to 
make her less pretty by punching her in the face and that’s 
why she started the fight. In this case, deforming the sister’s 
face is the original function of the fight, and it is the meaning 
of the fight according to my view, but it is not a positive mean-
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ing. So, even though the fight serves its original function, it is 
not a meaningful fight. 
Although the original function account of meaning re-
gards ML not as a normative notion but as a descriptive one, 
it still captures the basic intuitions of those who pose QML 
as a normative question. I take the normative interpretations 
of QML to be most directly about the meaningfulness rather 
than the meaning of life, but of course any question about the 
meaningfulness of life is indirectly also about the meaning of 
life, since meaningfulness is fulfilled positive original function 
and the original function is the meaning. All normative theo-
ries of ML, i.e. the supernaturalistic, subjective naturalistic and 
objective naturalistic theories, are theories about a positive ML. 
VI. Conclusion
I have argued that the best way to understand the con-
cept of the meaning of life is to interpret it as the original func-
tion of life. As I mentioned above, the concept of life must also 
be analyzed and I concede that a pluralist strategy would 
probably be more appropriate for the analysis of the concept 
of life. However, there is no inherent ambiguity in the notion 
of meaning in QML. In my view, whether we ask QML about 
existence as a whole, or about the existence of the human sp e-
cies, or about a hypothetical generic human life, or about a 
particular human life such as the life of the person who asks 
the question, we ask what its original function is. If a life has 
no original function or has a negative original function, then it 
cannot be meaningful. The search for what makes life objec-
tively meaningful is the search for a positive original function 
of life and the ways to fulfill that function.
I have tried to clarify the meaning and the meaningfulness 
of life conceptually, but I haven’t analyzed every concept that I 
use in my proposed analyses of these terms. I didn’t, for exam-
ple, discuss in detail what “positive” and “negative” mean when 
they are applied to the meaning. Before attempting to answer 
QML, these terms also need to be clarified. Even though my 
analysis of QML is not complete, I do think my original func-
tion view of ML and the related analysis of meaningfulness 
in terms of ML provide a good starting point and conceptual 
framework for those who are in search of the meaning of life.
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